

11 March 1976

Dr. Chamberlain:

Re: 8 March Drafts of NSCID 3

X1 1. [] draft has incorporated all of the substantive points in the two DOD drafts. The definitions in one of the DOD drafts are stated in the proposed NSCID 1 and apply to all NSCIDs and DCIDs. They do not have to be repeated here.

2. Suggest that you support [] draft with the following amendments:

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a. Add to the end of paragraph 2: "Intelligence Community organizations shall contribute in their areas of responsibility to the national intelligence products produced under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence." This is taken from the second page of the DOD drafts and levies a requirement not stated elsewhere.

b. "other requirements..." in the last line of paragraph 3 is vague. Suggest that the last line be replaced with: "national intelligence requirements." This language would identify the DCI as the source of "other requirements relating to the national security" in accord with paragraph 2 of this NSCID.

c. Change "...a national level current intelligence publication..." in the second line of paragraph 5a to: "...national current intelligence items and publications..." This would make the term consistent with the definitions of national intelligence and current intelligence, would permit more than one national current intelligence publication, and would be consistent with the last sentence of paragraph 5b., which calls for contributions to items as well as publications.

d. In paragraph 6b, change "...departments and agencies of the Intelligence Community." to "...Intelligence Community organizations." This would be consistent with the definitions in Section 2(b) of E.O. 11905.

e. Paragraph 7(b) calls for the DCI to make the determination of where to place new production responsibilities. The DOD drafts call for the CFI to make this determination. On the basis of responsibilities assigned to the CFI and the DCI in the E.O., this could be argued either way. The present NSCID 3 calls for the DCI, in consultation with USIB, to make this determination. This may be a task for a follow-on to USIB. Propose that it be left as a DCI responsibility, even if he exercises it as Chairman of CFI.



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Approved For Release 2004/11/04 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000900030001-4

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*Do not sign
add to NSCIR #2*

OVERT ACTIVITIES

Those intelligence activities in which U. S. Government sponsorship may be revealed on a need-to-know basis, but the public disclosure of which could be detrimental to the United States. These activities may be classified, and include, among other activities, collection of foreign positive intelligence information, (as authorized by NSCID-2), certain operational support, overt acquisition of foreign materiel, monitoring of foreign radio and television broadcasts, exploitation of foreign press information, and certain exploitation of defectors and other special aliens, the interrogation of refugees, escapees and POWs, and the debriefing of non-briefed and certain briefed legal travellers.,

NSCID No. 3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTIVE NO. 3

Intelligence Production

For the purpose of coordinating the foreign intelligence production activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and Executive Order 11905, 18 February 1976, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

E. O.

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall:

3. (d)(iv)

a. Act as the President's primary adviser on foreign intelligence and provide him and other officials in the Executive Branch with foreign intelligence including National Intelligence Estimates; develop national intelligence requirements and priorities; and supervise production and dissemination of national intelligence.

3. (d)(xi)

b. Act as the principal spokesman to the Congress for the Intelligence Community and facilitate the use of foreign intelligence products by Congress.

3. (d)(xii)

c. Promote the development and maintenance by the Central Intelligence Agency of services of common concern to the Intelligence Community organizations, including multi-discipline analysis, national level intelligence products, and a national level current intelligence publication.

3. (d)(xv)

d. Consult with users and producers of intelligence, including the Departments of State, Treasury and Defense, the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and the Council of Economic Advisors, to ensure the timeliness, relevancy and quality of the intelligence product.

4. (a)(2) 2. The senior officials of the CIA, Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, ERDA and the FBI shall contribute in areas of his responsibility to the national intelligence products produced under auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.
4. (b)(2) 3. The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, sociological and geographic intelligence to meet the needs of the President, the National Security Council, and other elements of the United States Government.
4. (c)(2) 4. The Secretary of State shall produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States foreign policy as required for the execution of his responsibilities and in support of policy-makers involved in foreign relations with the United States Government.
4. (d)(3) 5. The Secretary of the Treasury shall produce that intelligence required for the execution of the Secretary's interdepartmental responsibilities and the mission of the Department of the Treasury;
4. (d)(4) and contribute intelligence and guidance required for the development of national intelligence.
4. (e)(ii) 6. The Secretary of Defense shall produce and disseminate, as appropriate, intelligence emphasizing foreign military capabilities and intentions and scientific, technical and economic developments pertinent to his responsibilities.
4. (f)(1) 7. The Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration shall produce intelligence required for the execution of his responsibilities and the mission of the Energy Research and Development Administration, including the area of nuclear and atomic energy.

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-76-1268

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence
FROM : E. H. Knoche
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
SUBJECT : Revision of NSCID No. 3, "Intelligence Production"

1. References are:

a. A redraft of the existing NSCID No. 3, which it is recommended the CFI approve for forwarding to the National Security Council as part of a proposed new package of NSCIDs. (Tab A)

b. The existing NSCID No. 3, effective 17 February 1972.

2. In accordance with your direction at the 25 February CFI meeting, the existing NSCID No. 3 has been reviewed in the light of Executive Order 11905. The result is a complete rewriting of NSCID No. 3, in part because much of the present NSCID deals with the National Intelligence Survey program which has been terminated. Differences between the NSCID now in effect and the revision are these: (Paragraph numbers are keyed to the revision.)

a. Title First two words deleted:

COORDINATION-OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

b. Preamble

A new preamble has been substituted, using words provided by the CIA General Counsel. The purpose is to make clear that all of the relevant authorities available to the President and the NSC are the legal basis for the NSCIDs.

c. Paragraph 1

The subparagraphs describing production and dissemination responsibilities of the various Intelligence Community elements contain the exact wording from pertinent subparagraphs of the Executive Order. This replaces paragraph 7 a. through d. of the existing NSCID.

d. Paragraph 2

The definition of national intelligence is a shortened version of what now appears in paragraph 5 of NSCID No. 3. Subparagraph b. is from E.O. 11905, Section 3 (d) (1) (iv) and Section 4 (a) (2).

e. Paragraph 3

The definition of departmental intelligence is from paragraph 3 of the existing NSCID No. 3. Subparagraph b. is adapted from paragraph 6 of the existing NSCID No. 3.

f. Paragraph 4

Subparagraph a: The definition of interdepartmental intelligence is from paragraph 4 of the existing NSCID No. 3.

Subparagraph b: This statement is not in the E.O. or the existing NSCID but is considered a useful addition.

Subparagraph c: This is from E.O. 11905, Section 3 (d) (1) (xiv).

Subparagraph d: This is the last sentence of paragraph 5 in the existing NSCID No. 3.

g. Paragraph 5

Subparagraph a: The definition of current intelligence is from the existing NSCID No. 3, paragraph 2a.

Subparagraph b: This is from E.O. 11905, Section 3 (d) (1) (xii).

Subparagraph c: This is adapted from the present NSCID No. 3, paragraph 2b.

h. Paragraph 6

Subparagraph a: The definition of basic intelligence is adapted from paragraph 1a. of the existing NSCID No. 3.

Subparagraph b: This replaces paragraph 1 of the present NSCID No. 3; it recognized the NIS program has ended but leaves the way open for revival of something like a NIS program if the DCI so decides.

Subparagraph c: This CIA service of common concern function has not previously been listed in a NSCID. It is included as a follow-on to the charge CIA had under the NIS program to maintain an outline of all basic intelligence. The CIA AEGIS program responds to this requirement.

i. Paragraph 7

This paragraph resulted from a DoD initiative. The subject of "estimative intelligence" was not separately broken out in the present NSCID No. 3. No definition of "estimative intelligence" is in the present NSCID No. 3. Subparagraph b. is derived from E.O. 11905, Section 3 (d) (1) (iv) and subparagraph c. from E.O. 11905, Section 4 (a) (2) and the production responsibilities assigned in the E.O. to the individual organizations of the Intelligence Community.

j. Paragraph 8

Subparagraph a. is adapted from paragraph 7 of the existing NSCID No. 3.

Subparagraph b. is adapted from paragraph 8 of the present NSCID No. 3.

Subparagraph c. is derived from paragraph 3 i. of the present NSCID No. 1.

3. The task group considers that the revised NSCID No. 3 is unclassified, whereas the existing version is classified SECRET.

4. It is recommended the Committee on Foreign Intelligence approve forwarding the attached redraft of NSCID No. 3 to the National Security Council for its approval, but that the forwarding be deferred pending completion of the redraft of the other NSCIDs.

E. H. Knoche

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-76-1257
15 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence

FROM : E. H. Knoche
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

SUBJECT : Update of NSCID No. 7, "Critical Intelligence
Communications"

1. References are:

a. A redraft of the existing NSCID No. 7, which it is proposed the CFI approve for forwarding to the National Security Council as part of a new package of NSCIDs, if the CFI rejects the proposal, submitted by separate memorandum of 9 March 1976 that the NSCID No. 7 be rescinded. (Tab A)

b. The existing NSCID No. 7, effective 17 February 1972.

2. In accordance with your direction at the 25 February 1976 meeting, the task group which is reviewing all of the NSCIDs examined NSCID No. 7 and recommended that it be rescinded. This has been concurred in by all elements of the Intelligence Community except NSA.

3. The Director, NSA, on 9 March recommended by memorandum to Mr. Ellsworth's office that NSCID No. 7 be retained, noting

"...it is questionable whether the language in Executive Order 11905 fully covers the Secretary of Defense responsibility as 'Executive Agent of the Government to provide for the establishment, operation and perfection of such communications means necessary to provide the most timely transmission of critical intelligence to higher authorities'."

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4. As the memorandum already provided to CFI members indicates, the basic elements of NSCID No. 7 are contained in Executive Order 11905, and the review task group considered this made reissuance of NSCID No. 7 unnecessary.

5. This is not a major issue since the existing NSCID No. 7 is only four paragraphs long and there is no controversy as to its contents. The only issue was duplication between E.O. 11905 and NSCID No. 7 in the event the NSCID were reissued.

E. H. Knoche

Attachment: as stated

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE OD/I

15 March 1976

NOTE FOR: Dick Lehman

SUBJECT : Comments on NSCID 2, 3,
5 and 7

Dick —

Before making any comments, I would again like to go on the record as saying that other than agreeing reluctantly to definitions of national and departmental intelligence, whether it appears in NSCID 1 or 3, I would hope that we would try very aggressively not to include all of the other definitions. For whatever purpose they serve, there is not a one of them that is not included under the rubric of national or departmental intelligence.

NSCID No. 2

I have looked at the DoD change sheets and my only reaction is that for their paragraph 5 I would like to go back to the original version in the draft.

I don't understand the purpose of the definitional statement tabled by DoD on "overt activities." As far as I can tell, it does no damage but I can't see that it represents progress either.

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Page Two

NSCID No. 3

I would stop at the end of paragraph 3 in the DoD draft of 9 March, and I would delete through paragraph 7.

NSCID No. 5

I will yield to Dave Blee.

NSCID No. 7

I would still like to see this one deleted, but can go along with the re-draft if we have to have one.



Paul V. Walsh
ADDI

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15 March 1976

Dr. Chamberlain

Re: Proposed Changes to Draft NSCID 2

1. DOD-suggested definition of "overt activities."

a. DOD has raised an issue that is not widely perceived in or out of the Intelligence Community. There is confusion and disagreement on what the terms covert, overt, and clandestine mean; particularly in the distinction between covert and clandestine. Categories of foreign intelligence are carefully defined in NSCIDs 1 and 3, and the terms overt and clandestine are used, but undefined, in NSCIDs 3 and 5 respectively. The definition proposed by DOD could be improved on, but an authoritative definition is needed. Current approved CIA and JCS definitions are attached.

2. DOD-proposed Page 2.

a. The proposal to include counterintelligence information in paragraph 4 should be rejected as not appropriate to the scope of this NSCID. The preamble mentions overt foreign intelligence collection and not counterintelligence collection activities. Counterintelligence activities are covered in NSCID 5. Note that counterintelligence is not a function assigned to SECDEF in Section 4(e) of E.O. 11905.

b. The proposal to include "associated biographic information" in paragraph 4 is in accord with present division of responsibilities on biographic intelligence, but should not be construed to preclude other Intelligence Community components from collection or producing biographic intelligence on military personalities.

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
c. Suggest that the paragraph 5 in DCI/IC 76-1245 be retained instead of the proposed DOD substitution. The first sentence in the ICS version states the functions assigned to CIA by Section 4(b)(2) of E.O. 11905 and is a necessary reference to the "assigned functions" stated in both versions. Suggest that, at the end of the paragraph, "Senior U.S. Representative" be retained rather than "U.S. Chief of Mission." Coordination with the Department of State includes coordination with a Chief of Mission, in accord with the Secretary of State's wishes. "Senior U.S. Representative" would cover situations where a U.S. military commander has responsibilities that might otherwise be assigned to the Department of State.

d. It is not clear why DOD wants to drop paragraph 6 of the ICS version. Suggest it be retained.

e. Concerning paragraph 6 of the DOD version (paragraph 8 of the ICS version), suggest that both use the language of Section 4(b)(6) of the E.O: "...from cooperating sources in the United States." Suggest that the last sentence of the DOD version be added to end of the ICS version to acknowledge interests and expertise, other than CIA's, in this type of exploitation.

f. Suggest concurrence in the inclusion of "public" in the second line and "foreign" in the third line of DOD's paragraph 7, as stated in Section 4(b)(6) of the E.O.

g. Suggest the ICS version (paragraph 10) be adopted, which requires the DCI to coordinate foreign language exploitation with other departments and agencies; rather than paragraph 8 of the DOD version, which requires other departments and agencies to coordinate with the DCI.



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GLOSSARY OF OPERATIONAL TERMINOLOGY



OFFICE OF TRAINING

September 1964

Copy No 391

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COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS: Operations planned and executed so as to conceal true sponsorship, and to permit the sponsor plausibly to deny any responsibility for them, should this become necessary. Such operations are conducted in furtherance of national policies and objectives in the political, propaganda, economic and paramilitary fields, as a complement to the sponsor's overt missions abroad. Though clandestine techniques are used to assure concealment of sponsorship, covert operations usually are intended to produce a visible result and are thus distinguished from purely clandestine operations.

COVERT ASSOCIATE: An individual who cooperates in covert action for ideological reasons, without monetary compensation and under no control except dedication to the activity in which he is involved.

COVERT DISRUPTIVE ACTION: Activity undertaken in support of countersubversion (q.v.), such as harassment of individuals, provocations, fomentation or prevention of riots, and organization or dispersement of mobs.

CRYPTANALYSIS: The analysis of encrypted messages; the steps or processes involved in converting encrypted messages into plain text without initial knowledge of the key employed in the encryption.

CRYPTONYM: Code word or letter group used for purposes of security, especially in communications, to designate operations, projects, persons, organizations, or sensitive geographical areas.

CRYPTOSYSTEM: The associated items of cryptomaterial and the methods and rules by which these items are used as a unit to provide a single means of encryption and decryption. It embraces the general cryptosystem and the specific keys essential to the employment of the general cryptosystem.

CUSTOMER: See: CONSUMER.

CUTOUT: An intermediary or device used to obviate direct contact between members of a clandestine organization.

DEAD DROP: An unattended repository where messages or material may be placed by one member of a clandestine organization and recovered by another, thus serving as a cut-out (q.v.). Cf. LIVE DROP. See: MOVING DEAD DROP.

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CELL SYSTEM: The grouping of personnel into small units that are relatively isolated and self-contained. In the interest of maximum security for the organization as a whole, each cell has contact with the rest of the organization only through an agent of the organization and a single member of the cell. Others in the cell do not know the contact agent, and nobody in the cell knows the identities or activities of members of other cells.
Cf. NET.

CHICKENFEED: Build-up material (q.v.) specifically designed to make an opposing service receptive to subsequent deception material (q.v.).

CIPHER: A method of concealing the meaning of a message either (1) by replacing its letters by other letters or numbers in a predetermined manner (a substitution cipher) or (2) by changing the order of the letters according to certain rules (a transposition cipher).

CIVIC ACTION: The accomplishment by military forces of projects useful to the local population in such fields as health, sanitation, education, public works, agriculture, transportation, and communications.

CLANDESTINE COMMUNICATIONS: Any system of clandestine interchange of messages or material between elements of a clandestine organization. Includes personal meetings, cut-outs, air drops and sea delivery as well as written messages and radio or telephone communications.

CLANDESTINE OPERATION: A coordinated complex of activities designed to accomplish an intelligence, counterintelligence, or other similar purpose, sponsored and conducted by a governmental department or agency, or jointly by two or more such entities, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. Cf. COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS.

CLASSIFICATION: Designation of the degree of importance to the national security involved in a document, article, or piece of information--and, consequently, of the security precautions required to protect it. See: also CONTROL (2).

TOP SECRET: Information and material, the defense aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the nation.

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OPERATIONAL CONTROL: Comprises those techniques employed with the intent to assure that an operation is responsive to the direction of the sponsoring service. Such techniques are usually identified with the operational administration, motivation, or personal relationships involved in a clandestine project.

OPERATIONAL DATA: Information on the true identity of the source of an information report and on the circumstances under which the information was acquired.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: (1) Information or intelligence needed for planning, conducting, and exploiting an operation. (2) Information regarding the conduct of an operation.

OPERATIONS OFFICER: Sometimes used synonymously with CASE OFFICER (q.v.), but more frequently denotes an officer who supervises and directs the activities of several case officers.

OVERFLIGHT: Clandestine or covert air operations which involve flying over hostile territory.

OVERT OPERATIONS: Activities conducted in such a manner that they may be attributed to or acknowledged by the sponsoring government.

PAPER MILL: An individual or group that produces information, true or fabricated, for sale to any willing buyer. See: PEDDLER:

PARA DISPATCH OFFICER (PDO): An officer who accompanies an agent or group of agents infiltrating by air and who gives the jump orders to the agents when the aircraft reaches the drop zone.

PARAMILITARY FORCES: All ASSETS (q.v.) which are acquired for use in covert paramilitary operations.

PARAMILITARY OPERATION: (1) An operation undertaken by a paramilitary force. (2) An operation involving the use of violent methods (e.g., sabotage, guerrilla warfare).


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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (John O'Connor) JCS Pub. 1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DICTIONARY OF
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED
TERMS



(WITH THE NATO, SEATO, CENTO AND IADB GLOSSARIES INCORPORATED)

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3 SEPTEMBER 1974

terintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. (**DOD, I**) (It differs from covert operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor.)

clandestine operations—(NATO) Activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

clear—(DOD) In air intercept, a code meaning radar scope is clear of contacts other than those known to be friendly.

classification—(DOD, IADB) The determination that official information requires, in the interests of national security, a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, coupled with a designation signifying that such a determination has been made. See also **security classification**.

classification of bridges and vehicles—(DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB) Standard procedure for the parallel classification of bridges (or rafts, including their landing stages) and vehicles based on a range of vehicle types. The classification is applied by the allocation of class numbers to be marked on each vehicle and each bridge (or raft). See also **military load classification**; **route classification**.

classified contract—(DOD) Any contract that requires or will require access to classified information by the contractor or his employees in the performance of the contract. (A contract may be classified even though the contract document itself is not classified.)

classified information—(DOD, IADB) Official information which has been deter-

mined to require, in the interests of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure and which has been so designated.

classified matter—(DOD, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, IADB) Official information or matter in any form or of any nature which requires protection in the interests of national security. See also **unclassified matter**.

clean aircraft—(DOD, IADB) 1. An aircraft in flight configuration, versus landing configuration, i.e., landing gear and flaps retracted, etc. 2. An aircraft that does not have external stores.

cleansing station—See **decontamination station**.

clean weapon—(NATO, CENTO, IADB) A nuclear weapon in which measures have been taken to reduce the amount of residual radioactivity relative to a "normal" weapon of the same energy yield. See also **salted weapon**.

clear—(DOD) 1. To approve or authorize, or to obtain approval or authorization for: a. a person or persons with regard to their actions, movements, duties, etc.; b. an object or group of objects, as equipment or supplies, with regard to quality, quantity, purpose, movement, disposition, etc.; and c. a request, with regard to correctness of form, validity, etc. 2. Specifically, to give one or more aircraft a clearance. 3. To give a person a security clearance. 4. To fly over an obstacle without touching it. 5. To pass a designated point, line, or object. The end of a column must pass the designated feature before the latter is cleared. 6. a. To operate a gun so as to unload it or make certain no ammunition remains; and b. to free a gun of stoppages. 7. To clear an engine; to open the throttle of an idling engine to free it from carbon. 8. To clear the air to gain either temporary or permanent air superiority or control in a given sector.

For explanation of symbols, see page v.

enemy intelligence effort and leakage of information.

coverage—(DOD, NATO, IADB) 1. The ground area represented on imagery, photomaps, mosaics, maps, and other geographical presentation systems. (DOD, IADB) 2. Cover or protection, as the coverage of troops by supporting fire. 3. The extent to which intelligence information is available in respect to any specified area of interest. 4. The summation of the geographical areas and volumes of aerospace under surveillance.

coverage index—(DOD) One or a series of overlays showing all photographic reconnaissance missions covering the map sheet to which the overlays refer.

covering fire—(DOD, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, IADB) 1. Fire used to protect troops when they are within range of enemy small arms. 2. In amphibious usage, fire delivered prior to the landing to cover preparatory operations such as underwater demolitions or minesweeping. See also **fire**.

covering force—(DOD, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, IADB) 1. A force operating apart from the main force for the purpose of intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the enemy before he can attack the force covered. 2. Any body or detachment of troops which provides security for a larger force by observation, reconnaissance, attack or defense, or by any combination of these methods. See also **force(s)**.

covering troops—See **covering force**.

cover (intelligence)—See **cover**, Part 6.

cover search—(DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB) In air photographic reconnaissance, the process of selection of the most suitable existing cover for a specific requirement.

For explanation of symbols, see page v.

covert operations—(DOD, I, SEATO, IADB) Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

cover trace (reconnaissance)—(NATO, CENTO) One of a series of overlays showing all air reconnaissance sorties covering the map sheet to which the overlays refer.

crab angle—(NATO, CENTO) The angle between the aircraft track or flight line and the fore and aft axis of a vertical camera, which is in line with the aircraft heading.

crash locator beacon—(DOD, NATO, CENTO, IADB) An automatic radio beacon which will help searching forces to locate a crashed aircraft. See also **personal locator beacon**.

crash position indicator—See **crash locator beacon**.

crater—(DOD, IADB) The pit, depression, or cavity formed in the surface of the earth by an explosion. It may range from saucer shaped to conical, depending largely on the depth of burst. In the case of a deep underground burst, no rupture of the surface may occur. The resulting cavity is termed a camouflet.

crater depth—(DOD) The maximum depth of the crater measured from the deepest point of the pit to the original ground level.

crater radius—(DOD, IADB) The average radius of the crater measured at the level corresponding to the original surface of the ground.

creeping barrage—(NATO, CENTO, IADB) A barrage in which the fire of all units participating remains in the same relative

JCS Pub 1

formation printed or stamped upon a map or chart, in addition to that originally printed, to show data of importance or special use.

overrun control—(NATO, CENTO) Equipment enabling a camera to continue operating for a predetermined number of frames or seconds after normal cutoff.

overseas—(DOD) All locations, including Alaska and Hawaii, outside the continental United States.

overseas search and rescue region—(DOD) Overseas unified command areas (or portions thereof not included within the inland region or the maritime region). See also **search and rescue region**.

overshoot—(NATO) A phase of flight wherein a landing approach of an aircraft

is not continued to touch-down. See also **go around**.

over the beach operations—See **logistics over the shore operations**.

over-the-horizon—(DOD) A radar system that makes use of the atmospheric reflection and refraction phenomena to extend its range of detection beyond line-of-sight. Over-the-horizon radars may be either forward scatter or back scatter systems.

over-the-shoulder bombing—(DOD, IADB) A special case of loft bombing where the bomb is released past the vertical in order that the bomb may be thrown back to the target. See also **loft bombing**; **toss bombing**.

overt operation—(DOD, IADB) The collection of intelligence openly, without concealment.

15 March 1976

Dr. Chamberlain

Re: 12 March Draft NSCID 5

1. Note that "LIMITED DISTRIBUTION" is not recognized as a control marking in DCID 1/7.
2. Suggest that "and Executive Order 11905," be added to the preamble on line four after "amended."
3. The definition of clandestine activities in paragraph 1b confuses clandestine with covert and does not correspond to either the official JCS or CIA definitions (See Attachment to comments on NSCID 2.)
4. It might be better to use the definition of foreign counter-intelligence in E.O. Sec. 2(a)(2) in lieu of the definition proposed in paragraph 1d of this NSCID.
5. A comma is needed after "prior" in the first line of paragraph 2 as in the present NSCID.
6. Suggest that paragraph 8 be reworded in accord with paragraph 5h of the 4 March draft of NSCID 1:

"8. As mutually agreed between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense in active theaters of war when U.S. forces are engaged, or when the President so directs:"

The present language has led the JCS to believe that the creation of a CIA Force and the transfer to local military control in a military theater of operations (called for in paragraph 8a) should be automatic and they have inserted provisions for this in their war plans. The Agency has felt that such transfers should be selective and by DCI/SECDEF agreement (or Presidential directive) as a given crisis situation develops and has looked to paragraph 8b as their escape clause. This has become a bone of contention between JCS and CIA in the past two years and could be resolved by my proposed language.

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15 March 1976

Dr. Chamberlain

Re: Draft NSCID 7

These responsibilities are stated in Section 3(d)(xiii) and Section 4(e)(vi) of E.O. 11905. Only the designation of SECDEF as Executive Agent of the Government is not specified, though implied, in the E.O.



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15 March 1976

Dr. Chamberlain:

Re: 9 March DOD Draft of NSCID 3

1. Suggest that "...including National Intelligence Estimates;" deleted in the DOD version, be restored per E.O. Section 3(d)(iv). *- Per 2*

2. The term "...other requirements relating to the national security." in the last two lines of paragraph 3 is vague. Suggest that it be replaced with "national intelligence requirements." This language would identify the DCI as the source of "other requirements" in accord with paragraph 2.

3. Suggest that the second and third lines of paragraph 5a be rephrased: "...for production and dissemination of national current intelligence publications..." This would allow for more than one publication (as in current practice) and would be more in line with definitions in NSCID 1. The original wording is taken from E.O. Section 3(b)(xii).

4. The original wording of paragraph 6 should be retained. Basic Intelligence has been an activity characterized by duplication and lack of coordination in the past. It would be consistent with the intent of the E.O to have the DCI exercise leadership in this area, recognizing departmental interests and responsibilities particularly for tactical basic intelligence. *?*

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